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The ordinary client has no appreciation of problems involved in title
examination. He only realizes that almost every time that he sells or buys
a property, some lawyer raises a question about the title and that when he
can and does assert that the property has been transferred and encum-
bered over a long period of years and there have been many examinations
in which the title has been approved, his statement has no effect and he
has additional requirements that involve expense to him to satisfy the ex-
aminer. It is beyond his comprehension, and usually he concludes that
the lawyers don't know when the title is good. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, priority in time almost invariably determined
priority in right.2 If the owner (0) conveyed to A, there was no
interest remaining which could be conveyed to B, even if B was a
bona fide purchaser (bfp). "Notice and lack of notice were wholly
immaterial."3 Likewise, in contests between holders of equitable
interests, priorities were normally determined on the basis of time.
However, when the contest was between a party claiming a legal
* Professor Lawrence Berger, of the University of Nebraska College of Law,
deserves credit for many of the ideas in this Comment. Thank you.
This Comment was awarded the Robert G. Simmons, Nebraska Law Prac-
tice Award, October 1983.
1. Rankin, Defining Merchantable Title by Legislative Act, 25 NEB. I REV. 86, 92
(1945).
2. 0. BROWDER, JR., R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JuuIm & A. SMITh, BASIC PROPERTY LAW
872 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BROWDER].
3. Id. at 873.
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interest and another party claiming an equitable interest, the pri-
orities were sometimes reversed. "If the taker of the legal owner-
ship was a purchaser for value without notice, he [was] preferred
even as against an older equity."4 These rules, along with the de-
cline of seisin,5 led to the advent of the registry laws and recording
acts.6 "[T] he primary object of the recording system was to rid
conveyancing of livery of seisin but retain its publicital
advantages."7
In addition to the "publicital advantages," the enactment of re-
cording acts also served to allocate the risk of loss among innocent
parties by requiring grantees to give notice. 8
[The] recording acts proceed upon the theory that, where one of two per-
sons must suffer by the wrong or mistake of a third party, the one most at
fault, or the one whose fault made it possible that there should be a loss, is
guilty of a constructive fraud, and is the one who must suffer .... 9
Thus, one of the ultimate effects of the recording acts has been to
reverse the priorities as they existed at common law when a prior
grantee fails to give notice to subsequent purchasers from a com-
mon grantor.O This certainly comports with notions of fairness
and equity, and is now well-established as a sound principle of
law."
Yet, as with all good, there must come some bad. Because of
the broad scope of the instruments and transfers affected by the
recording acts,12 and the passing of time since their original enact-
ment,13 the land transfer records have become unmanageable in
4. Id. (footnote omitted).
5. C. MOYNIHIAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 90 (1962) [herein-
after cited as MoYNiAN]; see also IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5, at
537 n.17 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
6. IV AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.5, at 537 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); see also
Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IowA L REv. 261,
263 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Trends].
7. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice (pt. 1), 93 U. PA. L.
REv. 125, 139 (1944).
8. Id. at 147, 153.
9. 1 PATrON ON LAND TITLES § 19, at 99 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as PAT-
TON]; see also Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 213, 91 N.W. 250, 253 (1902).
10. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 532 (2d
ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as AXELROD].
There are three basic types of recording statutes: race, notice, and race-
notice. See IV AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.5, at 545 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952). Nebraska has a race-notice statute. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238 (1981).
11. But see Philbrick, supra note 7, at 147-51 (It is the race, rather than the notice
which should be important.).
12. IV AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.8, at 549 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); see also
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-203 (1981).
13. IV AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.5, at 535 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Ne-
braska's recording statute was originally enacted in 1866, one year before be-
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many jurisdictions simply due to their sheer volume.14 Moreover,
due to the number of "old title defects,"15 the "basic legal frame-
work for providing title security [has become] an albatross."' 6
[Other major] [w] eaknesses in the recording acts include: the extensive
and complex searches that must be made, both on and off record, to deter-
mine the apparent state of a title; inefficiently maintained and indexed
public records; the risk of outstanding title interests that cannot be ascer-
tained from any reasonable search; and limited effectiveness of recording
due to possible errors by recorders and chain of title restrictions on search
obligations. 17
Against this backdrop, the question is what has and should be
done to achieve a more efficient land transfer system.' 8 The next
section will discuss what has been done to remedy the difficulties
associated with the transfer of land, and section three will focus on
one specific remedy: the Nebraska Marketable Title Act. Section
four contains some recommendations for change and a brief
conclusion.
II. THE EARLY LAW
At common law, the process of transferring real property was
dependent upon livery of seisin.19
A and B, or their agents, would go upon the land and A would formally
"give" or "deliver" the seisin to B in the presence of witnesses from the
neighborhood. A would usually hand over to B a branch, twig or piece of
turf as a symbol of the land itself .... 20
coming a state. REV. STAT. OF THE TERRITORY OF NEB. ch. 43, § 16, at 283
(1866); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238 (1981).
14. See AXELROD, supra note 10, at 534; Aigler, Clearance of Land Titles-A Statu-
tory Step, 44 MICH. L. REV. 45, 48 (1945).
Marketable title acts are designed to shorten the length of the title search.
See UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT (USLTA) art. 3, pt. 3 intro-
ductory comment (1977); 1 SUGDEN ON VENDORS § 487, at 557 (1851) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SUGDEN] (derivation of the 60-year root of title). Due to the
relative youth of Nebraska's land transfer records, it is not as difficult to
search back to the patent. See Conine & Morgan, The Wyoming Marketable
Title Act-A Revision of Real Property Law, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 181,223
(1981) (This is an excellent article.).
15. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 45, 47 (1967) (This is the leading article on marketable title acts.).
16. Id. at 45.
17. AXELROD, supra note 10, at 534.
18. See P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TrrLES § 5, at 32 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as BASYE]; Barnett, supra note 15, at 94; Basye, Improvement of Conveyanc-
ing Procedure, 36 NEB. L. REV. 81, 84 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Conveyanc-
ing Procedure]; Patton, Evolution of Legislation on Proof of Title to Land, 30
WASH. L. REV. 224, 227 (1955); Rood, Registration of Land Titles, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 379 (1914).
19. MoYNmAN, supra note 5, at 163.
20. Id.
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It was not until the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 167721
that a writing was necessary to make a feoffment valid.22 The writ-
ten conveyance served as "evidence of livery of seisin and of the
nature of the estate given, as well as to set forth the covenant of
warranty."23
Once reliance was placed on title, rather than possession, in de-
termining real property rights, problems arose;24 and the reform
(written instruments) 25 was, itself, in need of reform.26 Thus,
came the advent of the registry and recording acts, and their con-
comitant problems. 27 But yet again, the law responded for, in eq-
uity, that which ought to be done was done.28 "Recognizing the
deficiencies of recordation, courts ... formulated a purchaser-ori-
ented doctrine of marketability designed to invalidate executory
sales contracts in the event a vendor [could not] tender 'marketa-
ble title,"' and while "a finding of unmarketability [was] often nec-
essary to reach equitable results between immediate litigants, the
finding operate[d] to destroy a title's value unless and until it
[could] be cleared by some remedial device." 29 Predictably, how-
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Howard, Bills to Remove Cloud From Title-With Reference to the State of
the Authorities in Virginia and West Virginia, 25 W. VA. LQ. 4, 5 (1917-1918);
see generally MOYNIBAN, supra note 5, at 90, 164; 5 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE § 1394 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as POMEROY]; 1 SUGDEN,
supra note 14, § 262, at 309; Patton, supra note 18, at 225 n.12 (citing W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAW (1927)); Comment, En-
hancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE UJ. 1245
(1959).
25. MoyunAN, supra note 5, at 90-91, 164; see also Howard, supra note 24, at 5.
26. Conveyancing Procedure, supra note 18, at 81-82.
27. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
28. POMEROY, supra note 24, at §§ 46, 363; Comment, supra note 24, at 1266.
29. Comment, supra note 24, at 1248-49 (footnotes omitted).
["Marketable title"] is vaguely defined as that title acceptable to a
reasonably prudent man, or that free from reasonable doubt or mate-
rial defect, or that providing assurance against loss or disturbance by
subsequent litigation. To give content to these abstractions, the
courts would ideally rule that every vendor be able either to trace a
complete chain of title to an unimpeachable source, or to prove the
nonexistence of any outstanding encumbrance. The former is im-
practical and the latter impossible. Since strict adherence to this ap-
proach could therefore result in the invalidation of all titles subjected
to judicial scrutiny, "marketable" title has no meaning as a positive,
juridical concept. What a court actually adjudicates is the ad hoc
question whether, as a matter of abstract logic, a given title is com-
mercially unmarketable.
Id. at 1249 (footnotes omitted). See also Panel Discussion, Sundry Title
Problems, 34 NEB. L. REv. 311, 312 (1955).
At common law, if the vendor was not aware of defects in title at the time
of the making of the contract for sale and a contract containing no conditions
19831
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ever, remedies to prevent the destruction of title's value due to un-
marketability simultaneously developed.30 With few exceptions,3 1
the same system of remedies has continued to the present.32 Un-
fortunately, the problem still remains: how to assure a marketable
title to an interest in real property in a reasonably efficient and
economic manner.33
The remainder of this Comment will be devoted to a discussion
of one remedial device: the Nebraska Marketable Title Act.34 Con-
ceived as its predecessors, 35 it is designed to promote a more effi-
cient system of land conveyancing. Whether it has achieved its
purpose will be evaluated after the Act has been analyzed.
was made, the purchaser was obligated to take the estate with all its defects.
1 SUGDEN, supra note 14, at 2, 7, 10. This is still the law. So, at common law, it
became the practice to have the vendor's title examined. Id. at 10. This oc-
curred during an executory period similar to the practice today. Id. at 461.
Furthermore, the vendor was under a duty to furnish the purchaser a title
which could be traced for at least 60 years. Id. at 7-8, 555. This was done by
the production of the instruments comprising the chain of title or by abstract.
Id. at 499.
When the date to perform the contract arrived, the purchaser was bound
to prepare a conveyance, i.e., a deed, and tender the purchase money. Id. at
308-10. "[Y] et if a bad title be produced, he may maintain an action for recov-
ery of his deposit, without tendering a conveyance." Id. at 310 (emphasis ad-
ded). But at law, if a good title was produced, the purchaser was required to
accept it even though defects of title existed. Id. at 455, 602, 605; see generally
BASYE, supra note 18, at § 4 (The distinction between good and marketable
titles no longer exists.).
When the property was conveyed, the purchaser became entitled to all the
title deeds. 1 SUGDEN, supra note 14, at 522-23; BASYE, supra note 18, at § 3; L.
SnmEs & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 3
(1960) [hereinafter cited as SIMES & TAYLOR].
30. See generally 1 POMEROY, supra note 24, at § 248 (quiet title actions); SIMES &
TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 18 (curative acts); 1 G. SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 658 (1846); 1 SUGDEN, supra note 14, § 486,
at 556-57 (adverse possession); 2 SUGDEN, supra note 14, §§ 615-16, at 54-55
(statutes of limitation).
31. Of the generally recognized means to remedy title defects, only title insur-
ance, see Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 492 (1957) (late nine-
teenth century), and the marketable title acts, see SnMES & TAYLOR, supra
note 29, at 306 (Iowa Act of 1919), are of relatively recent origin. See also
Comment, supra note 24, at 1251. Even a form of the Torrens system has
been in existence for over 500 years. McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land Title
Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE LJ. 1125, 1131 (1939).
32. See N-B. REV. STAT. § 25-202 (1979) (adverse possession); § 25-21,112 (1979)
(quiet title); § 76-258 (1981) (curative acts); § 76-288 (1981) (marketable title
act). These statutory references are illustrative of the types of remedial leg-
islation existing in most jurisdictions. Nebraska repealed its Torrens regis-
tration act. 1943 Neb. Laws 606.
33. See BASYE, supra note 18, at § 1; SimEs & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 305.
34. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1981).
35. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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II. THE NEBRASKA MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
A. History and Purpose
The purpose of [the Nebraska Marketable Title Act] is to define a mar-
ketable title to an interest in real estate, to require the filing of notice of
claim in interest in real estate in certain cases within a definite period of
time and to make invalid all claims not so filed.
The act follows the Michigan and Iowa laws. In substance it clears the
title to real estate of all defects. The provisions of the act are continuous
so that the statutory period of [twenty-three] years continues to run, thus
avoiding any subsequent re-enactments of the law. It will serve to correct
many titles to real estate in Nebraska.
3 6
This is how the Judiciary Committee of the Nebraska Unicam-
eral characterized the Act's objectives. Little else about the legis-
lative intent is revealed, due to the limited recordkeeping system
employed in the Unicameral during the forties. However, two ad-
dresses by J. Lee Rankin to the Nebraska Bar Association in 1945
and 1946 shed light on the rationale and objectives of the Nebraska
Act.37 Indeed, it was essentially the draft of the Nebraska Bar As-
sociation which was enacted into law in 1947.38 The draft statute
was modeled after the Iowa statute39 and a proposed statute in
South Dakota, yet substantially retained the important provisions
of the Michigan statute.4o By adopting substantially the same lan-
guage for the Nebraska Act as appeared in these other statutes, it
was believed that "the benefit of decisions in states adjacent to us
whose experience and development regarding real estate laws are
more or less common with ours" 4 1 would derive.
With these noble objectives in mind, it is now appropriate to
focus more clearly and narrowly on the practical purposes of the
Act.
The Act remedies a number of problems of the modem land
36. JuDICIARY Comm., 60th SEss., STATEENT-L.B. 175 (1947) (emphasis added).
The alteration of the statutory period to 23 years is made because the enacted
statute inconsistently describes the period as 22 and 23 years. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-290 (1981); Barnett, supra note 15, at 89 n.125; Leahy, The North Da-
kota Marketable Record Title Act, 29 N.D.L. REV. 265, 267 (1953) (discussing a
30 and 31 year inconsistency in the North Dakota statute). Due to this, con-
scientious title examiners in Nebraska will consider the statutory period to
be 23 years. See Aigler, supra note 14, at 55; Ballantine, Title By Adverse Pos-
session, 32 HARv. L. REV. 135, 137 (1918) (40-year root of title). See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-297 (1981); SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 3-6; Aigler, supra
note 14, at 48.
37. Rankin, Merchantable Title Legislation for Nebraska, 26 NEB. L. REV. 219
(1947) [hereinafter cited as Legislation]; Rankin, supra note 1.
38. Legislation, supra note 37, at 220, 223.
39. Id. at 221 n.8. Iowa has since amended its Act. See IOWA CODE § 614.29 (1983).
40. Legislation, supra note 37, at 222; see also Barnett, supra note 15, at 48 n.9.
41. Legislation, supra note 37, at 222.
1983]
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transfer system which are not adequately remedied by other stat-
utes and practices.
First, although the recording act voids certain unrecorded
transfers,42 no official verification of either the validity or the effect
of any transaction is made at the time of transfer.43 In essence, the
buyer remains at risk for all that the record reveals, or, in some
cases, fails to reveal.44 For example, a deed executed by an inca-
pacitated person is voidable, even against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser.45 Likewise, a forged instrument in the chain of title is
void and recording does not give it validity.46 The law should prob-
ably tolerate these somewhat anomalous occurrences, if the ad-
verse record interest is asserted in a timely manner.47 But if a
great number of years pass before asserting the rights, it becomes
more difficult to justify disturbing a reposed possessor because of
a defect which was not discoverable through a search of the land
records.48
Second, statutes of limitation4 9 and adverse possession5O do not
remedy all defects with the passage of time.5 1 It is fundamental
that before a statute of limitation or an adverse possession statute
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238 (1981).
43. Barnett, supra note 15, at 93; see also BROWDER, supra note 2, at 1002.
44. See generally AXELROD, supra note 10, at 615-16; BASYE, supra note 18, at
§ 279; BREWSTER ON CONVEYANCING §§ 426-31 (1904) [hereinafter cited as
BREWSTER]; PATRON, supra note 9, at § 334; SnMEs & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at
4, 343; Barnett, supra note 15, at 85, 91; McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra
note 31, at 1128; Rood, supra note 18, at 389-90; Straw, Jr., Off-Record Risks for
Bona Fide Purchasers of Interests in Real Property, 72 DIcn. L REV. 35 (1967).
45. See Jones v. Jones, 183 Cal. App. 2d 468, 472, 6 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (1960); Dewey
v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 (1893) (cited in AXELROD, supra note 10, at
615); Thompson v. Thomas, 163 N.C. 500, 79 S.E. 896 (1913); Jarrett v. Jarrett,
11 W. Va. 584, 622, 626 (1877).
See also BREWSTER, supra note 44, at § 347; PATrON, supra note 9, at § 334.
46. See King v. De Tar, 112 Neb. 535, 199 N.W. 847 (1924); see also PATrON, supra
note 9, at § 62; Straw, supra note 44, at 44.
47. Timely assertion of the interest would be essential in the case of a forged
deed because adverse possession could clear the title. But in the case of the
grantor's incapacity, the statute of limitations would be tolled. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-202 (1979).
48. Although not a marketable record title statute, Wisconsin has enacted a stat-
ute dealing with this very situation. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.09 (West 1981).
49. Statutes of limitation bar causes of action because of the claimant's failure to
sue. Marketable title acts extinguish interests which may not even be action-
able. See SnMEs & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 4; Aigler, supra note 14, at 50 n.7.
50. Unlike most statutes of limitation, adverse possession not only bars an ac-
tion, but it also creates a property right. Adverse possession generally is not
recordable, so resort must be had to a suit to quiet title or the marketable title
act. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 46; Conveyancing Procedure, supra note
18, at 83.
51. See Conveyancing Procedure, supra note 18, at 85-86; Trends, supra note 6, at
266.
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can begin to run, a cause of action must have accrued.52 For exam-
ple, if 0 severs the surface estate from the mineral estate before
the adverse possessor (AP) begins possession, AP's possession
will only be adverse against the surface estate if AP only lives on
Blackacre, but does not mine Blackacre. 53 Therefore, the mineral
deed will not be removed by adverse possession of the surface
estate.5 4
Third, curative acts,55 title insurance,56 malpractice liability,57
and title standards 58 do not resolve all of the residual problems.
To summarize and better illustrate the basic problem created
by reliance on the recording system as a means of conveyancing
and title security,59 consider the only case to date to be decided
under the Nebraska Marketable Title Act, Smith v. Berberich.60 In
Smith, the court decided this issue:
[Whether or not the] appellees, successors in interest of a grantee of the
land by quitclaim deed from a tenant in common, which had been re-
corded more than [twenty-three] years, who have the capacity to own real
estate in Nebraska and who are in possession thereof, with nothing ap-
pearing of record which purports to divest them or their predecessors of
52. Rood, supra note 18, at 392. For a discussion of the elements which must be
proven to establish adverse possession in Nebraska, see Foster, Nebraska
Law of Adverse Possession (pt. 3), 23 NEB. L. REV. 105 (1944).
53. See mI APERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.14, at 831 nn.27-28 (A.J. Casner ed. 2d
printing 1974); see also USLTA, supra note 14, art. 3, pt. 3 introductory com-
ment (1977); NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASS'N, LAWYER'S DESK BOOK, TrrLE EXAM-
INATION STANDARDS No. 54 (1959 & Reissue 1976) [hereinafter cited as NEB.
TITLE STANDARD] (unreleased forfeited oil and gas leases).
54. See, e.g., Winslett v. Rozan, 279 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1960); see also Conine &
Morgan, supra note 14, at 218.
55. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-258 (1981); Comment, supra note 24, at 1259.
56. See Johnstone, supra note 31; Straw, supra note 44, at 88.
57. See AXELROD, supra note 10, at 654.
58. NEB. TITLE STANDARD, supra note 53. The title standards which have been
promulgated to assist in the interpretation of the Marketable Title Act in-
clude numbers 42-45, 52, 56-57. Id.
59. See generally Trends, supra note 6, at 261. At this point, it must be conceded
that there are very few cases where a defect in title cannot be remedied by
means other than a marketable title act. See SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29,
at 4-5, 355; Barnett, supra note 15, at 89. Indeed, one may question whether
Professor Rood was speaking with hyperbole when he wrote: "The fact is
that the path of the searcher for a safe title to land under either of the cld
systems is beset by more traps, sirens, harpies, and temptations than ever
plagued the wandering Ulysses, the faithful Pilgrim, or the investor in gilt
edged securities." Rood, supra note 18, at 388.
Courts have seen fit to do what was necessary and equitable without the
aid of marketable title acts. See, e.g., White v. Batson, 317 So. 2d 205 (La. Ct.
App. 1975), writ denied, 320 So. 2d 915 (La. 1975); Ruemmele, The North Da-
kota Marketable Record Title Act, 41 N.D.L. REV. 475, 477 (1965). But the mar-
ketable title acts are designed to obviate the necessity of bringing suit. See
infra note 81 and accompanying text.
60. 168 Neb. 142, 95 N.W.2d 325 (1959); see also Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 846, 851 (1960).
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such purported interest therein, have the entire title to the land to the
exclusion of appellants who are the successors in interest of another ten-
ant in common, by reason of the Marketable Title Act.6 1
The record title in Smith traced from a patent to the heirs of
Lewis E. Smith, who were ten brothers and sisters. The patent
was dated September 14, 1911.62 One of the siblings, Francis, quit-
claimed the land to his wife, Lizzie, on September 2, 1913.63 Lizzie
died intestate on December 29, 1935. A decree of heirship was ren-
dered on May 4, 1946, as part of the administration of Lizzie's es-
tate.6 The decree assigned the entire tract to Lizzie's heirs, the
appellees.
The appellees brought an action to quiet title. 65 "The patent,
the quitclaim deed and the decree of heirship constitute [d] the en-
tire chain of title to the land as it [was] evidenced and exhibited
by the public records .... "66 The appellants, heirs of one of the
original patentees, were impleaded.67 The trial court held for the
appellees and the supreme court reversed.68
The supreme court held that the quitclaim deed did not qualify
to invoke the aid of the Act because it only conveyed the interest
that the grantor had in the property, which was an undivided one-
tenth interest as a tenant in common, and did not purport "to cre-
ate an entire title to the land in the grantee .. ".."69 In essence,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a quitclaim deed cannot
serve as a root of title from which a marketable record title may be
61. 168 Neb. at 144, 95 N.W.2d at 326.
62. Brief of Appellants at 5, Smith v. Berberich, 168 Neb. 142, 95 N.W.2d 325
(1959).
63. Id. The quitclaim deed was recorded October 8, 1913. See also Brief of Appel-
lees at 13 ("The deed itself... containIed] no limitation or exception in the
description of the property. There the grantor conveyed to the grantee this
property together with an additional 640 acres."). The actual words of con-
veyance are set forth in the opinion. 168 Neb. at 145-46, 95 N.W.2d at 327
("grant... and forever quit-claim... all his... interest... in ... the...
described real estate") (emphasis added). "[T]he deed did not purport to
create in her a larger interest. It did not purport to transfer the interest in the
land owned by the other tenants in common." 168 Neb. at 149, 95 N.W.2d at
329. See infra note 72.
64. 168 Neb. at 143, 95 N.W.2d at 326. This decree could have served as a root of
title had it been entered at least 23 years prior to the commencement of the
lawsuit. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (1981); see also Barnett, supra note 15, at 65.
65. 168 Neb. at 143, 95 N.W.2d at 326.
66. Id.
67. 168 Neb. at 142, 95 N.W.2d at 325; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,113 (1981).
It is quite likely that the quiet title action was brought in order to satisfy
the oil and gas lessee. 168 Neb. at 143, 95 N.W.2d at 326; Brief of Appellants at
3.
68. 168 Neb. at 149, 95 N.W.2d at 329.
69. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the Smith opinion, see infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
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determined.7 0 This being the case, the question may properly be
asked as to whether any of the other remedial devices discussed in
this section could have been invoked at the time the suit to quiet
title was brought in order to clear the title in the heirs of Lizzie
Smith.
With little consideration, it is clear that curative acts would not
have applied. There were no formal defects in the execution of the
quitclaim deed, but there was an outstanding interest in the heirs
of another of the patentees. Second, title insurance probably
would have been of no avail because insurance for a defect in title
revealed by the record, as a practical matter, cannot be
purchased.7 1 Third, there was no indication of any sort of malprac-
tice by an attorney rendering the title opinion or of an abstractor in
compiling the abstract.72 In fact, any attorney examining the title
at the time the suit to quiet title was brought would likely have
concluded that marketable record title was in the heirs of Lizzie
because of title standard number 52.73 Finally, adverse possession
70. See Brief of Appellees at 15.
In Wilson v. Kelley, 226 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), after citing
Smith, the court held that a quitclaim deed conveying all of the grantor's
interest in Blackacre cannot serve as a root of title where the grantor does not
own Blackacre in fee or does not expressly purport to convey a specifically
defined interest in land, whether done fraudulently or not. Id. at 128; see also
Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 205. This is the rule of Smith. For a more
detailed analysis, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
71. See Johnstone, supra note 31, at 494-95.
72. There was no failure to discover a defect which resulted in the appellees' loss
of their property.
Originally, Francis' attorney probably advised him to convey the property
to Lizzie by means of a quitclaim deed. Quitclaim deeds can be used to con-
vey a fee without the making of warranties. Troxell v. Stevens, 57 Neb. 329, 77
N.W. 781 (1899) (cited in Foster, The Law of Convenants For Title in Ne-
braska, 1 NEB. L. BuL. 1, 50 (1922)). Francis knew that he could not warrant
to Lizzie his title to the fee, because he was only a cotenant. Nevertheless, he
conveyed his interest in the entire tract, rather than conveying an undivided
one-tenth interest in the property. See supra note 63. See 168 Neb. at 149, 95
N.W. 2d at 329 (quitclaim is root of title if cotenants are defrauded); infra text
accompanying note 101; see also Barnett, supra note 15, at 58; Conine & Mor-
gan, supra note 14, at 205 (criticize this sort of logic).
See also Brief of Appellants at 7-8; Brief of Appellees at 4-7, 12-15 (evi-
dence outside the deed is used to defeat it); AXELROD, supra note 10, at 505.
73. NEB. TrrLE STmNDARD No. 52, supra note 53. The standard stated:
STANDARD No. 52 Marketable Title Act-Commencement of Chain.
Marketable Title Act--Quitclaim Deed-An unbroken chain of ti-
tle, within the meaning of the Marketable Title Act, may originate in
a quitclaim deed.
A quitclaim deed is a "conveyance or other title transaction"
which '"purports" to create an interest in the grantee within the con-
templation of Sec. 76-289, R.R.S. Neb. 1943. While originally quitclaim
deeds were used to release the interest or claim of the grantor to one
who already had an interest in the land, in modern times they are
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did not operate to vest title to the land in Lizzie's heirs presumably
because they did not actually possess any part of the property in
question.7 4
In sum, Smith illustrates the very sort of problem the Nebraska
Marketable Title Act was meant to address: the problem of old in-
terests which are awakened from a deep sleep in the public land
records.7 5 And despite the reluctance of the Nebraska Supreme
Court to do so in Smith, "it is recognized that meritorious interests
may occasionally be cut off by the act, [but] the benefits resulting
to the people of the State from clearing land titles warrants such a
commonly used as primary conveyances to a stranger to the title.
See, H. H. Foster, "Convenants for Title," 1 Neb. Law Bull., No. 1 P.
50. A quitclaim deed has been held to be a "conveyance" protected
by our recording acts. Schott v. Dosh, 49 Neb. 187, 68 N.W. 346; Ban-
nard v. Duncan, 79 Neb. 189, 112 N. W. 353. See also: 16 Am. Jur. 447,
627, 628; 45 Am. Jur. 518; 44 A. L. R. 1266; 162 A. L. R. 556.
The 1976 reissue of title standard number 52 contains this reference to
Smith:
However, in Smith v. Berberich, 168 Neb. 142, 95 N. W. 2d 325, the
particular Deed conveying all "my" interest, where the record
showed that the Grantor owned only a 1/10 interest, was held to be
insufficient within the meaning of the Act. The effect of this case is
that the document must purport to convey the land itself, and not
merely the Grantor's interest therein. This construction can arise by
covenant, Warranty, recital in the Deed itself or even by implication.
See also Brief of Appellants at 9; Brief of Appellees at 12.
It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that the appellees' attorney was un-
willing to rely on the marketable title act, and, instead, brought suit to quiet
title. See Rankin, supra note 1, at 92 (commenting on the failure of attorneys
to rely on the Act).
74. Neither the opinion nor the briefs in Smith make reference to actual posses-
sion of the property. An affidavit of possession was filed by the appellees on
June 6, 1958. Brief of Appellants at 6; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-294 (1981);
Aigler, supra note 14, at 51 (application of the marketable title acts to vacant
lands); Rankin, supra note 1, at 91 (reference to "hostile possession").
It is fundamental that in order for constructive possession to ripen into
adverse possession there must be: "(1) color of title, and (2) actual posses-
sion of part of the land claimed thereunder." Foster, supra note 52, (pt. 2) at 6
(footnotes omitted). In Smith, both the quitclaim deed, id. (pt. 3) at 117, and
the judicial decree of heirship, id. at 120 (analogizing the judicial decree of
heirship to a purchase of property at a mortgage foreclosure sale), could have
satisfied the color of title requirements. But, presumably the land was never
actually possessed, which necessitated the filing of the affidavit.
See also BROWDER, supra note 2, at 39-42.
75. The Act may be conceptualized as permitting a statutory type of adverse pos-
session without the necessity of complying with the normal requirements of
gaining title to land by adverse possession. See supra note 74. Instead, the
Act provides for a statutory adverse possession if an unbroken chain of title
of record for 23 years can be shown to an interest in land; possession may be
actual or constructive. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288, -294 (1981). See generally
Aigler, supra note 14, at 51; Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 181; Ruem-
mele, supra note 59, at 481.
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result just as is the case where vested rights are wiped out by oper-
ation of the recording acts."76 It is this positive frame of reference,
that is, looking to and protecting that which was done most re-
cently, rather than giving priority in time of recording priority in
right, which generally distinguishes marketable title acts from the
recording acts.7 7 Marketable title acts are intended to reverse the
usual priorities as established under the recording system so as to
cause individuals to diligently protect their interests in land or be
subject to having them extinguished.7 8
B. The Act
Before the provisions of the Nebraska Marketable Title Act are
analyzed, two basic principles underlying marketable title acts
should be stated. First, marketable title acts are designed to work
in conjunction with the recording acts, and not to supplant them.79
This means that the marketable title act should be harmonized
with the recording act to the greatest extent possible, but should
generally be allowed to override the recording act when irreconcil-
able conflicts arise.80 Second, marketable title acts are designed to
avoid the necessity of bringing suits to quiet title.81 Instead, the
acts bar slumbering interests and cause an automatic cleansing of
the record.82 These two principles serve as the interpretative foun-
dation for the Act. It is now appropriate to track the statute.
Section 76-288 states the basic rule:
Any person having the legal capacity to own real estate in this state, who
has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in real estate by himself and
his immediate or remote grantors under a deed of conveyance which has
been recorded for a period of twenty-[three] years or longer, and is in
possession of such real estate, shall be deemed to have a marketable rec-
ord title to such interest, subject only to such claims thereto and defects of
title as are not extinguished or barred by the application of the provisions
of this act, instruments which have been recorded less than twenty-
76. Rankin, supra note 1, at 91; see also Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 121,
83 N.W.2d 800, 825 (1957); Aigler, supra note 14, at 50; Barnett, supra note 15,
at 47, 90.
77. See Conveyancing Procedure, supra note 18, at 86; Trends, supra note 6, at
268. The recording acts do not extinguish rights as do the marketable title
acts. The recording acts decide the rights of the parties who derive title from
a common grantor; they do not apply in the case of a "Wild" deed.
See also Foster, Nebraska Law of Adverse Possession (pt. 1), 11 NEB. L.
BULL. 378, 379 (1933) (same notion applies to adverse possession).
78. See SmiEs & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 344; Barnett, supra note 15, at 57;
Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 181, 188, 199, 211.
79. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 52.
80. Id. at 84; but see infra note 146 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 85.
82. Id. at 54.
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[three] years, and any encumbrances of record not barred by the statute
of limitations. 8 3
On its face, section 76-288 is far from clear. Therefore, a closer
examination of the section is necessary to expose its true meaning
and hidden traps. The basic concept of the Act derives from
the idea that a person qualified to own land . . . [and] in possession
thereof who could show a record title to such land in himself or in himself
and predecessors in interest for as long as [twenty-three] years ought to
be, in an overwhelming percentage of instances, a safe person from whom
to take a deed or mortgage, and that a title derived from such person
should be made safe, subject only to such outstanding interests as appear
of record within that [twenty-three-] year period. The idea obviously has
some resemblance to the "root-of-title" that has played a large part in Eng-
lish land title transactions. 8 4
Indeed, the Model Marketable Title Act 85 operates from an applica-
tion of the "root of title" concept. It defines root of title as
that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person,
purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which he
relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most
recent to be recorded as of a date [twenty-three] years prior to the time
when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the "root of
title" is the date on which it is recorded.
8 6
Although the Nebraska Act does not specifically define root of title,
the concept is clearly embodied in sections 76-288 and 76-290,87 as
"the record title covering a period of twenty- [three] years or more
subsequent to the recording of deed of conveyance as set out in
section 76-288 ....
To illustrate the basic concept, consider this example: 0 con-
veys Blackacre to A by warranty deed in 1959. In 1960, 0 conveys
Blackacre to B by warranty deed. Both deeds are promptly re-
corded. Under the recording act, A prevails over B, but, in 1983,
under the Marketable Title Act, B will have a "marketable record
title"89 to Blackacre, and A's interest will be "barred and not en-
forceable in law or equity .... -90 It is immaterial that B
purchased with notice or that no title transaction has occurred in
83. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-288 (1981).
84. Aigler, supra note 14, at 50-51. The alteration of the time period to 23 years is
done to make the quotation conform to the Nebraska Act. This will be done
throughout the Comment. See supra note 36. See also 1 SUGDEN, supra note
14, § 487, at 557.
85. MODEL MARKETABLE TITLE ACT (L. Simes & C. Taylor 1960) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL ACT], reprinted in SMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 6.
86. MODEL ACT § 8(e).
87. See infra text accompanying note 156 ("deed of conveyance under which title
is claimed"); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-297 (1981); Barnett, supra note 15,
at 52.
88. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-297 (1981). See also SrMEs &TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 11;
Barnett, supra note 15, at 533; Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 191.
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-288 (1981).
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981).
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1983.91 There are, however, certain other requirements of, and ex-
ceptions to the Act which may affect the outcome of this hypotheti-
cal case. These will be discussed and developed in the remainder
of this subsection.
Subject to the claims and defects of title excepted from the op-
eration of the Act, persons who satisfy the four requirements for
invoking the aid of the Act are deemed to have marketable record
title. In order to invoke the aid of the Act, persons must: (1) have
the legal capacity to own real estate in Nebraska; (2) have an un-
broken chain of title to any interest in real estate by the person
and the person's immediate or remote grantors; (3) have the un-
broken chain of title trace through a deed of conveyance which has
been of record for twenty-three years or longer; and (4) be in pos-
session of such real estate.
The first requirment of section 76-288 is that the person invok-
ing the aid of the Act must have the legal capacity to own real es-
tate in Nebraska.92 The Act contains no definition of "person," but
presumably corporations, partnerships, estates, and trusts, as well
as natural persons, are encompassed within the term. The legal
capacity to own any interest in real estate in Nebraska is defined
by state property law.9 3
The second requirement of section 76-288 is that the person and
the person's immediate and remote grantors must have (1) an un-
broken chain of title, (2) to any interest in real estate. Section 76-
289 defines these two elements:
A person shall be deemed to have the unbroken chain of title to an inter-
est in real estate as such terms are used in this act when the official public
records of the county wherein such land is situated disclose a conveyance
or other title transaction dated and recorded twenty- [three] years or more
prior thereto, which conveyance or other title transaction purports to cre-
ate such interest in such person or his immediate or remote grantors, with
nothing appearing of record purporting to divest such person and his im-
mediate or remote grantors of such purported interest.9 4
The requirement that there be an unbroken chain of title is
quite clear. "[U]ntil all gaps in the post-root chain are filled by
recorded quitclaim deeds or other recorded curative instruments
or proceedings, the extinguishment feature of the [Act] will not
91. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 53; Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 199.
92. See, e.g., Graf v. State, 118 Neb. 485, 487-88, 225 N.W. 466, 467 (1929); Chapman
v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890, 898-99, 62 N.W. 320, 322 (1895); Conine & Morgan, supra
note 14, at 189; infra note 93.
93. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. 11, § 18 (minors; persons under disability); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 4-107 (1977) (aliens); § 21-2004 (1977) (corporations); § 42-202
(1978) (married women); § 67-308 (1981) (partnerships); § 76-202 (1981) ("pur-
chaser" defined).
94. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (1981); see also SIMES & TAYLoR, supra note 29, at 11.
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operate."9 5 But to the extent that the requirement that there be an
unbroken chain of title is clear, the interests which the Act pro-
tects are equally unclear. Simes and Taylor recognized this in dis-
cussing the Model Act:
The statutes vary as to the kind of interest made marketable. The Michi-
gan type of statute quiets the title to "any interest." . . . In general, it
may be said that, in the vast majority of cases, the statute is needed to
clear the title to a fee simple, and that, as a practical matter, the value of
the act would not be greatly impaired if it were limited to fees simple. On
the other hand, it clearly could not be limited to fees simple absolute, for
the problem which it frequently seeks to solve is how to transform a fee
simple, which is shown by the record not to be absolute, into a fee simple
absolute. But if we try to designate what fees simple are protected by the
act and what are not, we encounter no end of difficulty. It would seem that
the Michigan approach is desirable, even though situations rarely involve
anything but a fee simple.9 6
The third requirement of section 76-288 is that the unbroken
chain of title trace through a deed of conveyance which has been of
record9 7 for twenty-three years or longer. Because this require-
ment has been interpreted by the Nebraska Supreme Court, it is
necessary to return to Smith.
In Smith, the court held that a quitclaim deed could not serve
as the root of title in order to invoke the aid of the Act.98 The court
reasoned that because a quitclaim deed only conveys "any interest
or title of the grantor in and to the land described rather than the
land itself,"9 9 the "weakness and defect of the claim of appellees
[was] that they assert[ed] an interest in the land more extensive
than that which the quitclaim deed purported to create in the
grantee named in that deed."0 The court went on to say:
If the conveyance from Francis L. Smith to Lizzie M. Smith had purported
to create an entire title to the land in the grantee, it would have satisfied
the provision of the Marketable Title Act and appellees would have been
qualified to have invoked the aid of that act to sustain their claim of title to
the land. The conveyance on which they rely was not of that character.10 1
At first blush, the Smith opinion seems to make sense. At the
date of the quitclaim conveyance, Lizzie became a tenant in com-
95. Barnett, supra note 15, at 65 (footnote omitted); see also Conine & Morgan,
supra note 14, at 192.
96. SimEs & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 351-52 (footnote omitted); see also Barnett,
supra note 15, at 64-65; Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 193.
97. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (1981) ("official public records of the county
wherein such land is situated"); Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 192-93.
98. See supra notes 69 & 87 and accompanying text. For a case in which a quit-
claim deed served as the root of title, see Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hart-
ford, Conn., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941).
99. 168 Neb. at 146, 95 N.W.2d at 327.
100. 168 Neb. at 149, 95 N.W.2d at 329; see also Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at
219 n.117.
101. 168 Neb. at 149, 95 N.W.2d at 329.
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mon with her husband's nine siblings. Lizzie could have used the
entire tract without prejudicing the rights of the other joint own-
ers. Only if she had excluded her cotenants would a cause of ac-
tion have arisen against Lizzie. 0 2 So even if Lizzie had used the
entire property, the rights of the other tenants in common would
not be prejudiced by the quitclaim deed in the absence of the ap-
plicability of the Act. Should the Act have applied? It seems so,
despite the rather sound reasoning of the court. 0 3
Most importantly, the Smith court failed to clearly distinguish
between the effect of a conveyance of a fee simple interest by war-
ranty deed and by quitclaim deed. It is well-settled that a fee sim-
ple absolute can be conveyed by either a warranty deed or
quitclaim deed.10 4 Moreover, either type of deed only conveys that
interest which the grantor owns; neither grants the land itself if
the grantor does not have fee simple absolute title to the property.
The words of conveyance in the two types of deeds are equally ef-
fective or ineffective to actually convey the fee, and both types of
deeds can purport to convey the fee without being effective to ac-
tually convey the fee.105
The warranties which distinguish the warranty deed from the
quitclaim deed serve to preserve certain causes of action against
the grantor which would otherwise be lost upon the acceptance of
the deed by the grantee. The warranties are only promises given
by the grantor to the grantee respecting the title conveyed. They
in no way increase or decrease the interest which the deed pur-
ports to convey. 06 So the court's reliance on the fact that the quit-
102. See BROWDER, supra note 2, at 316.
103. The result reached by the court may be fair. It allowed all the known heirs of
the patentees to share equally in the value of the mineral rights. Apparently
no one had actually been in possession, yet when the decree of heirship was
entered in 1946, the world was on notice that Lizzie's heirs apparently had
paramount rights.
104. See supra notes 72-73. A quitclaim deed can also be used "to release the in-
terest or claim of the grantor to one who already has an interest in the land
.... " NEB. TrrLE STANDARD No. 52 comment. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees at
13, Smith.
105. See AXELROD, supra note 10, at 1154; BROWDER, supra note 2, at 995-96, 1000
(citing Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969),
affd, 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970)). The Act focuses on the interest "which [the]
conveyance.., purports to create .... " NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (1981). It
makes no reference to what is warranted. But applying the Smith court's ra-
tionale, if Francis had conveyed by warranty deed, presumably the result in
the case would have been different. Yet, in fact, the warranty deed would
have been no more effective to convey the fee than the quitclaim actually
was.
106. See AXELROD, supra note 10, at 504-06 ('"The [warranties] generally guaran-
tee that grantor owns what he purports to grant ... .") (emphasis added).
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claim deed lacked warranties 07 is clearly misplaced, and its tacit
assertion that any type of deed could be used to convey more than
a grantor owns is clearly erroneous.108
It makes no difference that Francis did not have the power to
convey a fee simple interest to Lizzie or that Lizzie was not a bona
fide purchaser.109
[S]ince the purpose of the marketable title statutes is to eliminate the
need for searching back to the sovereign, such statutes are not concerned
with the quality of the title conveyed by the root. So long as the instru-
ment serving as the root of title purports to convey an interest, it is effec-
tive to extinguish prior claims and interests. 1 10
In Smith, the quitclaim deed purported to convey the entire
tract"' and should have been effective to extinguish the claims of
the "slumbering" cotenants. The decision by the Nebraska
Supreme Court would require that quitclaim deeds actually,
rather than purportedly, convey the interest claimed because,
otherwise, the interest asserted would be "more extensive than
that which the quitclaim deed" actually conveyed.112 This the Act
does not command. 113
Of course, only interests which are inconsistent with the root of
title are extinguished by the operation of the Act.114 In this case,
Francis quitclaimed the entire tract to Lizzie. 1 5 This grant is pur-
portedly inconsistent with the rights of the other cotenants. This
is all the Act requires.
Although not uniformly rejected, 116 the rationale underlying
Smith has been questioned by some authorities.1 7 Professor Bar-
nett stated:
[A] bare quitclaim of "all grantor's right, title, and interest in and to
Blackacre" probably could not serve as a root of title to Blackacre, be-
cause under Model Act § 8(e) the root of title must "purport to create the
interest claimed" by the marketable record title holder. A bare quitclaim
107. 168 Neb. at 145, 95 N.W.2d at 327.
108. Id. at 149, 95 N.W.2d at 329.
109. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
110. Barnett, supra note 15, at 57; but see Wilson v. Kelley, 226 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1969); Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 203-05.
111. See supra notes 63 & 72 and accompanying text.
112. 168 Neb. at 149, 95 N.W.2d at 329. By its nature, the Act will always operate to
vest more in the person invoking the Act than the person had before its appli-
cation; this is because the Act bars certain interests of record.
113. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-289 (1981).
114. See SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 295; Barnett, supra note 15, at 64,
Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 191.
115. See supra notes 63, 72 & 103-04.
116. See Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 201-02; Ruemmele, supra note 59, at
479-80.
117. SIM ES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 349; Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 191-
92, 205.
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does not purport to create any specific interest in the grantee. Smith v.
Berberich, 168 Neb. 142, 95 N.W.2d 325 (1959). The mere absence of war-
ranty covenants, however, should not prevent a quitclaim deed from serv-
ing as a root of title when it evidences an intent to convey the land.1 1 8
Similarly, the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act,"n9
and, recently, the Iowa,120 Kansas,121 and Wyoming122 marketable
title acts have specifically provided that a quitclaim deed may
serve as a root of title.
In sum, the third requirement of section 76-288 has been given a
rigid interpretation by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In Smith, the
court held that a quitclaim deed could not be a root of title because
it purported to grant only the grantor's interest in the land, and not
the land itself. This conclusion is not consistent with the purposes
of the Act23 and has been called into question by later authority.
The fourth requirement of section 76-288 is that the person be in
possession of such real estate. Such possession may be actual or
constructive.124 "[P] ossession of real estate referred to in section
76-288 may be shown of record by one or more affidavits which
shall contain the legal description of the real estate referred to and
show that the record titleholder is upon the date thereof in posses-
sion of such real estate.' 25
After delineating the four requirements which must be satisfied
in order for a person to be deemed to have a marketable record
title, section 76-288 excepts certain claims and defects of title from
the operation of the Act. A marketable record title is "subject only
to such claims thereto and defects of title as are not extinguished
or barred by the application of the provisions of this act, instru-
ments which have been recorded less than twenty-[three] years,
and any encumbrances of record not barred by the statute of
limitations."126
The first class of exceptions specified in section 76-288 are those
118. Barnett, supra note 15, at 58 n.40, 79; Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 207-
08.
The pertinent language from MODEL ACT § 8(e) should be contrasted with
the language of NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (1981) ("purports to create such in-
terest in such person," rather than "purport to create the interest claimed").
Also, did Francis intend to convey the entire tract? See supra notes 70 & 72.
119. USLTA, supra note 14, § 3-301(5) (1977).
120. IOWA CODE § 614.29 (1983).
121. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3402(g) (1976).
122. Wyo. STAT. § 34-10-101(vi) (1977).
123. See SuIES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 347; Rankin, supra note 1, at 91.
124. Ruemmele, supra note 59, at 480.
125. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-294 (1981); but cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.101 (1967)
(no hostile possession); see also Aigler, supra note 14, at 51; Barnett, supra
note 15, at 53 n.31; Legislation, supra note 37, at 220, 223; Rankin, supra note 1,
at 91.
126. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-288 (1981) (emphasis added).
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claims and defects of title which are not extinguished or barred by
the application of the provisions of the Act. These excepted inter-
ests are listed in section 76-298.
The first exception specified in section 76-298 prevents applica-
tion of the Act to bar "the rights of any lessor or his successor as
reversionary of his right to possession on the expiration of any
lease by reason of failure to file the notice herein required."127
Professor Barnett stated that "[w] ithout such an exception, a long-
term lessee might, without the knowledge of his lessor, give an ab-
solute deed to his transferee rather than merely an assignment of
the leasehold estate and, after the deed had been of record
[twenty-three] years, thereby cut off the lessor's title."'1 28
The second exception in section 76-298 protects the rights of re-
maindermen upon the expiration of any life estate or trust created
before the root of title. This exception found its way into a number
of marketable title acts 129 after the Iowa Supreme Court inter-
preted the Iowa Act to extinguish the rights of contingent remain-
dermen who were not even born at the time the root of title was
created.13 0
The third exception in section 76-298 protects rights founded
upon any mortgage, trust deed, or contract for the sale of lands
(installment land contracts)131 which are not barred by the statute
of limitations. "Removing mortgages, trust deeds, and contracts of
sale from the purview of the act was based upon the thought that
separate statutes should be applied to these."132 In Nebraska,
mortgages must be foreclosed within ten years after the cause of
action accrued. 133 'The trustee's sale of property under a trust
127. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-298 (1) (a) (1981). For a discussion of the notice require-
ment, see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
128. Barnett, supra note 15, at 78.
129. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-11(b) (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-30-
12 (1967).
130. Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941).
It is interesting to note that when Iowa amended its marketable title act in
1969, it did not create such an exception. See IOWA CODE § 614.36 (1983); see
also SimEs & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 357; Barnett, supra note 15, at 78;
Ruemmele, supra note 59, at 485.
131. "Contracts for the sale of land" is a term generally used to describe the con-
tract executed between a buyer and seller of real estate which conditionally
binds the parties to deliver and accept a deed at some later date. Presuma-
bly, the drafters of section 76-298 were not referring to such contracts which
by their nature and terms are short-lived. Rather, the term which probably
should have been used was "installment land contract." An installment land
contract is a financing and security device.
The same ambiguity exists in section 76-239, where the term "real estate
sale contract" is used.
132. Ruemmele, supra note 59, at 485.
133. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202 (1979).
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deed shall be made within the period prescribed by law for the
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust
deed,"'34 which is usually five years.135 The statute of limitations
for installment land contracts is five years.136
The fourth exception in section 76-298 prevents conditions sub-
sequent contained in any deed from being barred. However, in Ne-
braska, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry or reentry for
breach of a condition subsequent are valid for only thirty years. 3 7
The final exception in section 76-298 states that the Act shall not
be "deemed to affect the right, title or interest of the State of Ne-
braska, or the United States, in any real estate in Nebraska."138
While such an exception is consistent with the general statutory
treatment of governmental interests, 139 Simes and Taylor believed
that even this exception unnecessarily undermines the ultimate
effectiveness of the marketable title acts:
The exception of government interests found in a number of the statutes
is believed to be undesirable. Probably the interest of the United States
could not be destroyed by a marketable title statute, and this is true
whether the act makes an exception of that sort or not. Hence such an
exception does no harm. But to except interests of the state or of munici-
palities would seem undesirable, since it would too greatly impair the
value of the act, and since there is no good reason why the state or a mu-
nicipality should not fie a notice just as other owners of remote interests
are required to do. 14 0
The second class of exceptions specified in section 76-288 are
those instruments which have been recorded less than twenty-
three years. On its face this exception seems quite innocuous, for,
by definition, the Act only operates to extinguish interests which
are at least twenty-three years old.141 But below the surface, a po-
tential trap for the unwary exists.
Professor Barnett illustrated the situation as follows: 142 In 1959,
0 conveys Blackacre to A, who immediately records. In 1960, 0
conveys to X, who immediately records. In 1972, A conveys to B,
who immediately records. The issue is whether in 1983 the convey-
ance from A to B prevents extinguishment of the A-B chain in
favor of X because there is a competing interest of record which is
less than twenty-three years old. The answer is unclear.
134. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1015 (1981).
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-205 (1979).
136. Id. See supra note 131.
137. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,102 (1981); see also SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at
357; Leahy, supra note 36, at 273; Ruemmele, supra note 59, at 485.
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-298(2) (1981).
139. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202 (1979).
140. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 357.
141. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981); see supra note 36.
142. Barnett, supra note 15, at 54-55.
19831
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
First, absent the conveyance from A to B, X would have a mar-
ketable record title in 1983; A's interest would be extinguished.143
But A conveyed to B in 1972 and the instrument has been recorded
less than twenty-three years. Clearly, in 1972, A's interest would
have been given priority under the recording act, and B would
have prevailed over X. The issue is what effect, if any, the Act has
on the B v. X lawsuit in 1983.
In 1983, it could be argued that the Act operates to vestX with a
marketable record title because X has had an unbroken chain of
title for twenty-three years. Therefore, because B derives title
from A, and A's interest in the property has been extinguished by
operation of the Act, X should prevail over B. Notwithstanding,
the precise issue under the Act is whether B's instrument has
been recorded less than twenty-three years. 4 4 If so, then the Act
is not applicable to B's interest; X will not be deemed to have a
marketable record title, and B should prevail over X in the lawsuit
in 1983 because of the recording act priorities.45 This seems to be
the proper result in this hypothetical case.
This result is also supported by the mandate of section 76-295.
Section 76-295 states: "Nothing contained in this act shall be con-
strued ... to affect the operation of any existing acts governing
the effect of the recording or the failure to record any instrument
affecting lands."' 4 6 The sweeping language of this section seems
irreconcilable with the basic principle that marketable title acts re-
verse the priorities as they exist under the recording act. 47 In or-
der to harmonize section 76-295 with the broader principles and
purposes of the Act, a limiting interpretation must be found. Un-
fortunately, in the research conducted herein no cases on point
were discovered. However, in the seminal work on marketable ti-
tle acts, Professor Aigler said that the section "makes it clear that
[the Act] works no changes in the application and operation of le-
gal principles as to recording, adverse possession, prescription,
etc., insofar as events and transactions during the [twenty-three]-
year period are concerned."48 So in the B v. X lawsuit in 1983, the
recording act, and not the marketable title act, should provide the
basis for the decision.
The third class of exceptions specified in section 76-288 are any
143. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-288 (1981) ("subject ... to.. . instruments which have
been recorded less than twenty-[three] years").
145. For a discussion of the proper analysis under the Model Marketable Title Act,
see Barnett, supra note 15, at 55 (The language of the comparable exception
in the Model Act is substantially different than in section 76-288.).
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-295 (1981); but cf. MODEL ACT § 7.
147. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
148. Aigler, supra note 14, at 54 (emphasis added).
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encumbrances of record not barred by the statute of limitations.
Like much of the other language in the Act, this phrase is sweeping
and is in need of a principled interpretation.149 Professor Barnett
believed that the phrase operated to protect all recorded ease-
ments from extinguishment. 150 This interpretation does account
for the language of the statute and serves to protect certain encum-
brances of record which have social utility in excess of their bur-
den on the land.'51 Nevertheless, this interpretation represents
nothing more than an ad hoc policy determination since there is no
principled way to limit the statutory language only to recorded
easements.152 For just as surely as a recorded easement is an en-
cumbrance of record not barred by the statute of limitations, so,
too, is a grant or reservation of mineral rights, which antedates the
root of title purporting to convey the fee, an encumbrance of record
not barred by the statute of limitations;153 and it is contemplated
that the mineral interest would be barred by the Act.54
Despite its unprincipled and overinclusive nature, Professor
Barnett's interpretation of this ambiguous phrase is best and
should be followed in order to protect certain socially useful en-
cumbrances from extinguishment. This interpretation comports
with the purpose of the Act which seeks to extinguish ancient de-
fects which have lost their social utility. 55
In sum, section 76-288 sets forth the criteria which must be sat-
149. This is also an unusual provision. In the research conducted herein only two
states were discovered which have a similar provision. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-19.1-01 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAw ANN. § 43-30-1 (1967). Besides the Bar-
nett article, see infra note 150, the only other reference to the phrase is ob-
lique. See Legislation, supra note 37, at 220; see generally 2 PATroN, supra
note 9, at § 561.
150. Barnett, supra note 15, at 73.
151. See generally Smms & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 218, 224 (discussion of why
these interests generally should be excepted from the operation of the acts);
see also MIcH. Comp. LAw ANN. § 565.104 (1967) (In 1946, the Michigan Act
was amended to provide an exception for easements.); MODEL ACT § 6; Ber-
ger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 M-N. L
REV. 167 (1970).
152. In fact, it could be argued with equal force that the phrase means that all
easements are barred by the Act. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981) (all
such interests are barred). Indeed, the phrase could be interpreted to mean
that only those encumbrances of record which are expressly limited by stat-
ute are not extinguished if the specific statute of limitations has not run. For
example, since easements are not limited in duration by statute, they neces-
sarily come within the class of defects of record barred by the Act.
For a discussion of the ramifications of barring all easements, see SmEs &
TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 218, 224.
153. See 2 PATRON, supra note 9, at § 596.
154. See Conine & Morgan, supra note 14, at 219; but see USLTA, supra note 14, art.
3, pt. 3 introductory comment (1977).
155. This is an implication drawn from the Act itself. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-
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isfied in order for a person to be deemed to have a marketable rec-
ord title; it also declares certain exceptions to the general rule.
Section 76-288 does not, however, expressly define which interests
are barred by the operation of the Act. To determine this, refer-
ence must be made to section 76-290.
Section 76-290 provides:
Such marketable title shall be held by such person and shall be taken by
his successors in interest free and clear of all interest, claims, and charges
whatever, the existence of which depends in whole or in part upon any act,
transaction, event, or omission that occurred twenty-[three] years or
more prior thereto, whether such claim or charge be evidenced by a re-
corded instrument or otherwise, and all such interests, claims, and
charges affecting such interest in real estate shall be barred and not en-
forceable at law or equity, unless any person making such claim or assert-
ing such interest or charge shall, on or before twenty-three years from the
date of recording of deed of conveyance under which title is claimed, or
within one year from April 8, 1947, whichever event is the latest in point of
time, file for record a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth
the nature of his claim, interest or charge; and no disability nor lack of
knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone shall operate to extend the
time for filing such claims after the expiration of twenty-three years from
the recording of such deed of conveyance or one year after April 8, 1947,
whichever is the latest in point of time.156
Section 76-290 is quite clear. It declares that a marketable rec-
ord title is held "free and clear of all interest [s] . . . the existence
of which depends in whole or in part upon any act. . . or omission
that occurred twenty- [three] years or more prior to thereto
. ... "157 The most difficult question raised by this general rule is
whether the interests inherent in the muniments of the chain of
record title are extinguished. Although the Model Act specifically
provides for the preservation of such interests, 5 8 no similar provi-
sion is found in the Nebraska Act. In fact, the language of section
76-290 is quite to the contrary: it operates to extinguish all inter-
ests the existence of which depends in whole or in part upon any
act or omission that occurred prior to the root of title.
To illustrate the problem, consider this example: 0 leases
Blackacre to A for ninety-nine years in 1959. A records, but does
not go into possession. In 1960, 0 conveys Blackacre to B in fee,
subject to the lease; B records. In 1983, may B declare that he pos-
sesses a marketable record title to Blackacre and that A's lease-
hold is barred? The result under the Nebraska Act is uncertain.
However, it appears that A's interest exists, at least in part, upon
288, -290 (1981). See also Barnett, supra note 15, at 75, 87; Conine & Morgan,
supra note 14, at 185-86.
156. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981) (emphasis added).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. MODEL ACT § 2(a); see also SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 11; Conine &
Morgan, supra note 14, at 202.
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an act before the root of title. This interpretation leads to a some-
what questionable result which, when compared to the Model Act
and the Michigan Act,159 may not have been contemplated by the
drafters.160
Section 76-290 goes on to provide that "all such interests...
shall be barred and not enforceable at law or equity, unless.., on
or before twenty-three years from the date of recording of deed of
conveyance under which title is claimed ... notice in writing...
[is filed]."161 In essence, the Act is more than a statute of limita-
tions because it bars all interests not expressly preserved by the
Act.162 So, even in equity, a court could not enforce an interest in
real estate prior to the root of title,163 unless it falls within the ex-
ceptions to the Actl64 or notice has been filed.165 Disabilities do
not toll the operation of the Act.166
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The history of the recording acts has been traced and the
problems resulting from reliance on the recording system as the
principal means of securing titles have been developed.167 The his-
tory and purposes of the Nebraska Marketable Title Act, as a reme-
dial device, have been discussed, and the Act has been analyzed.
159. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 565.101 (1967); but see Aigler, supra note 14, at 53.
160. On the other hand, it could be argued that the requirement that a person
claiming a marketable record title have an unbroken chain of title under a
deed of conveyance which has been of record at least 23 years, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-288 (1981), contemplates that all that is revealed in the root of title
is preserved. But apparently the drafters of the Michigan Act thought other-
wise or they would not have included a specific reference to muniments of
title. See supra note 159.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-275.04 through -275.05 (1981) may affect the analysis,
too. Generally, these sections create rebuttable presumptions that refer-
ences or recitals in certain recorded instruments are valid only for 20 years.
161. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-290 (1981) (emphasis added).
162. See Rankin, supra note 1, at 91; Legislation, supra note 37, at 221.
What effect the Occupants and Claimants Act may have on persons whose
interests are barred is unclear. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-301 (1982). No provi-
sion for remuneration of persons whose interests are extinguished is pro-
vided in the Marketable Title Act. See BROWDER, supra note 2, at 1004 (citing
Barnett, supra note 15, at 85).
163. Even a title by adverse possession prior to the root of title would be barred
by the Act because both recorded and unrecorded interests are barred. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981); see also SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 13;
Ruemmele, supra note 59, at 482.
164. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288, -298 (1981).
165. For specific requirements regarding notice, see NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-291,
-292, -296 (1981); see also Snmus & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 15.
166. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-290 (1981).
167. See generally Rood, supra note 18, at 380, 387-88, 392.
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It is now time to take stock of what has been presented, make rec-
ommendations for change, and briefly conclude.
A close evaluation of the Nebraska Marketable Title Act reveals
several matters which warrant consideration by the Nebraska Uni-
cameral. First, the Act should be amended to remove the twenty-
two year and twenty-three year inconsistency. North Dakota rec-
ognized this anomaly early and corrected the mistake.168 Ne-
braska should do the same. Second, the "encumbrances of record"
clause in section 76-288 should be amended or deleted. No princi-
pled manner of interpreting the phrase seems to exist. Presuma-
bly, the phrase is designed to protect certain socially useful
encumbrances, like easements and restrictive covenants. If that is
what was intended, language similar to that used in the Model Act
should be employed. Finally, section 76-288 should be amended to
clarify whether interests revealed in the muniments of title are to
be extinguished by the Act. If these amendments are made, the
Nebraska Act should be better able to accomplish its stated objec-
tives. While it will never be a panacea, the Act should be a handy
tool in the bag of the lawyer who assists clients in closing real es-
tate transactions. Despite its billing,169 this is all the Act was ever
meant to accomplish.170
Summarily, the major benefits resulting from the enactment of
marketable title acts are:17 1 (1) the extinguishment of most pre-
root defects, and (2) the general simplification of title examination.
On the negative side, marketable title acts (1) "have destroyed the
assurance of a grantee by conveyance from the record owner that
his interest is indefeasible";l7 2 and (2) extinguish some interests
in real estate that have continuing social utility. Consequently, the
Nebraska experience seems to be that the Act has been largely ig-
nored by attorneys.173 This may, in large part, also be due to the
hostility shown the Act by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-03 (1978); see also Leahy, supra note 36.
Language similar to that used in MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 565.103 (1967)
should be used rather than simply copying the North Dakota Act. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-03 (1978) ("twenty years or more" and "on or before
twenty years").
169. See generally SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 3; Conine & Morgan, supra
note 14, at 181; Rankin, supra note 1.
170. See Aigler, supra note 14, at 58.
More recent developments in the area of title protection and security in-
clude automation of land title records and federal government intervention.
See AXELROD, supra note 10.
171. See BROWDER, supra note 2, at 1002 (citing Barnett, supra note 15).
172. BROWDER, supra note 2, at 1002.
173. See Rankin, supra note 1, at 92. This conclusion is reached on the basis that
there has only been one case reported which interprets the Act, and no schol-
arly writing concerning the Act has been published since 1947. Notwithstand-
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Smith.'74
Recognizing these limitations, what then should be done to sim-
plify and facilitate real estate transactions in Nebraska? Many
commentators have suggested resort to the Torrens system, 7 5 and
Nebraska has had some experience with this system.? 6 Yet, from
this vantage point, it seems that resort to the Torrens system
would be destined to the same fate that its ancestors exper-
ienced: 7 7 It would soon be discovered that the Torrens system
does not solve all of the problems either. In fact, the Torrens sys-
tem may be the least satisfactory of all solutions because it re-
quires the establishment of government machinery to do the work
and the government is notoriously inefficient. 7 8 It would seem
that the best solution to the problem is also the one that no one
seems willing to place faith in: honest and intelligent lawyering.? 9
Within the problem,180 lies the solution. It is not a simple solution.
But, therein lies the challenge: "to keep the whole present absurd
system from collapsing under its own weight."' 8 '
Gregory B. Bartels '83
ing, this may also lead to the conclusion that the Act is so well understood
that litigation and commentary are unnecessary.
174. Smith should be reconsidered by the Nebraska Supreme Court at the earliest
convenient time.
175. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 15, at 92; McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra note
31, at 1151; Rood, supra note 18, at 393; Trends, supra note 6, at 262.
176. See supra note 32.
177. See Conveyancing Procedure, supra note 18, at 81.
178. But see McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra note 31, at 1132-33. See also Com-
ment, supra note 24, at 1253.
179. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 92.
180. See supra text accompanying note 1.
181. Barnett, supra note 15, at 94.
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